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CRIME AND PUBLICITY: THE IMPACT OF NEWS ON THE AoMINIS· 
TRATION OF JUSTICE. By Alfred Friendly and Ronald L. Goldfarb. 
New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1967. Pp. 335. $5. 
Since the Supreme Court's decision on the case of Dr. Samuel 
Sheppard,1 we have been subjected to a steady stream of books, 
magazine articles, and newspaper commentaries dealing with the 
problem of reconciling the sometimes conflicting rights of fair trial 
and free press. Crime and Publicity is yet another effort to provide, 
as the publisher's fanfare suggests, a "searching analysis of urgent 
issues" which is sorely needed in our present efforts to solve the 
difficult problem of handling prejudicial publicity in criminal cases. 
I approached this book with anticipation, since the co-author-
ship of Alfred Friendly, associate editor of the Washington Post, and 
Ronald L. Goldfarb, a lawyer in Washington, D.C.,2 seemed to be a 
rather impressive pedigree for a book dealing with this subject. 
Unfortunately, the product fails to live up to its lineage. The col-
laboration of a working newsman and a practicing lawyer could 
have been expected to illuminate the issues which never seem to 
emerge sharply in the continuing and contentious dialogue between 
associations of the news media and of the bar. I expected a forth-
right, moderate analysis giving rise to proposals for workable solu-
tions. In fact, my major reaction was one of disappointment. The 
book has little to recommend it to either a legal or a lay audience. 
There are no novel or interesting propositions for the lawyer possess-
ing a reasonable degree of familiarity with recent developments in 
criminal procedure, not to speak of those with particular knowledge 
of the problems presented by prejudicial publicity in criminal cases. 
For the lay reader there is only a highly detailed rehash of some of 
the more sensational recent cases-from Sheppard to Ruby. And, 
even this is often hampered by prolix prose and dubious legal ex-
planations and references. 
The major effort of the book is to justify the publication of pre-
judicial publicity by the news media on two grounds. The first is 
that such publicity occurs in only a small number of cases and thus 
has only an insignificant total effect. Although the authors admit 
that there are serious abuses by the news media in this small number 
of cases, they fail to provide comfort for the unfortunate defendants 
1. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
2. Actually, one might well be surprised to learn that Mr. Goldfarb, billed as an 
active trial lawyer, was able to devote his full time to the preparation of this book 
from May 1965 until August 1966. Mr. Goldfarb is also described as a "lawyer who 
has specialized in writing on legal questions for a lay public." However, at least one 
of his previous major publication efforts has been the subject of rather harsh com-
ment by reviewers. See Keefe, Practicing Lawyers' Guide to the Current Law Maga• 
zines, 52 A.B.A.J. 590 (1966); Subin, Book Review, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1966). 
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involved. Indeed, they seem to consider the unpleasant effects on 
these persons as but a risk of the game. The second justification is 
that there are serious evils in our present system of administering 
criminal justice which should be corrected before any attack is made 
upon the minor sins of the news media. 
All of the usual arguments are mustered in support of these 
propositions; the keystone, of course, being the absolute nature of 
the first amendment. Historically and emotionally, this is a persua-
sive argument, particularly in light of the sympathetic reception of 
this rationale by the Supreme Court. However, one wonders why 
this view of the first amendment in the fair trial-free press context 
is any more fixed than were the recently modified interpretations 
of the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. The authors also 
invoke the press' role as a control upon abuses in the administra-
tion of criminal justice; however, they are unconvincing in their 
assertions that this watchdog function would be seriously impaired 
by the imposition of reasonable restrictions upon the nature and 
quantity of the press coverage at criminal proceedings. An impartial 
observer might well inquire into the frequency of beneficial press 
exposes of wrongdoing and corruption by law enforcement and judi-
cial officers as compared to the number of instances of harmful and 
prejudicial publicity, many of which Crime and Publicity candidly 
records. 
It is difficult to accept the assertion that, regardless of any evil 
effects, the public has an absolute right to know all the details of 
crimes, law enforcement activities, and criminal prosecutions. It is 
even more difficult to believe that the average member of the read-
ing public demands the kind of coverage which has become all too 
frequent in the news media. If any such demand does exist, it is 
one that has been carefully cultivated by the news media, inspired 
not by lofty principles but by profit motives. To the press, "news" 
is what sells; and, what is news must be printed in order to preserve 
the freedom of the press and assure the right of the public to be 
informed. Coupled with an increasingly weak libel law, this serves 
to place the news media in a uniquely untouchable position: to 
whom is the press responsible? A true exponent of individual liber-
ties might well doubt the wisdom of such a concentration of power 
in one institution of our society. 
The standard reply to these criticisms, although it is perhaps 
not completely responsive, is that the press has exercised, and will 
continue to exercise, a high degree of voluntary restraint in dis-
seminating prejudicial publicity. The record fails to support this 
pious statement, and Friendly and Goldfarb clearly admit that these 
"voluntary restraints" are of little value as a means of controlling 
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prejudicial publicity. Certainly no other conclusion is tenable as 
long as newspaper editors remain members of the human race.3 
In a rather transparent attempt to shift the onus from the news 
media, the authors focus on the sins of the legal profession and sub-
ject the keepers of Professor Kamisar's "gatehouse''-law enforce-
ment officers-to a very harsh treatment indeed. While one cannot 
honestly deny that these groups are often subject to human frailties, 
guilty of inaction, and even of misconduct, it is difficult to under-
stand why this should excuse equally culpable conduct by the press. 
I might also add that this type of argument does not contribute to 
a solution of the problems with which we are faced. Little progress 
will be achieved until all of the people in all of the glass houses 
stop throwing stones at one another. 
The authors have also overestimated the effectiveness of the var-
ious procedural devices which are presently available to alleviate 
the adverse effects of prejudicial publicity in criminal trials. Ex-
perience teaches us that motions for change of venue and for con-
tinuance, voir dire examination of jurors, and cautionary instruc-
tions by trial judges are rarely resorted to by the trial bar-thus 
indicating that the practicing bar does not find these remedies par-
ticularly effective. The authors' argument that increased use of these 
procedural devices would solve the problems created by dissemina-
tion of prejudicial publicity by the news media also fails to recog-
nize that these devices were not designed to cope with publicity of 
the magnitude and intensity common today. Once national news 
media publicize events connected with a criminal proceeding in a 
prejudicial manner, it is extremely doubtful whether any procedural 
device could effectively dispel the evil effects. 
The authors apparently view appellate reversal as an adequate 
remedy for any abuses not cured by the above procedures. This is 
understandable from a layman, but not from a member of the legal 
profession. Reversal coupled with a new trial is a poor solution, if, 
indeed, it is any solution at all. Quite apart from the expense to a 
person who is presumed to be innocent, and all of the other evil 
effects to both the system of the administration of criminal justice 
and the individual concerned, there is little reason to expect that 
the publicity will be any less offensive the second time around. In-
3. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 365 n.13 (1946) (concurring opinion of 
Frankfurter, J.): 
See the skeptical remarks of H. L. Mencken, a stout libertarian, on the efficacy 
of journalistic self-restraint: "Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine. Essen-
tially, they are as absurd as would be codes of streetcar conductors, barbers or 
public jobholders. If American journalism is to be purged of its present swinish-
ness and brought up to a decent level of repute-and God knows that such an 
improvement is needed-it must be accomplished by the devices of morals, not by 
those of honor. That is to say, it must be accomplished by external forces, and 
through the medium of penalties exteriorly inflicted.'' Quoted by LeViness, in 
Law and the Press, The Daily Record, Baltimore, March 11, 1932, p. 3, col. 1, 4. 
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deed, experience indicates that reversals-particularly those in the 
Supreme Court-simply make a case more attractive from the point 
of view of the press. 
The authors shed no new light on the problem and offer no 
new workable solutions. One is forced to wonder whether the final 
conclusion of the book justifies its publication: "At a minimum 
frequent meetings between representatives of the press and the bar 
at the local level would provide useful education to both sides" 
(p. 256). 
Francis C. Sullivan, 
Professor of Law, 
Louisiana State University 
